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An elementary proof that P ≠ NP1 
Bhupinder Singh Anand2 
We show that, if PA has no non-standard models, then P ≠ NP. We then 
give an elementary proof that PA has no non-standard models. 
1. Introduction 
In a paper presented to ICM 2002, Ran Raz comments [Ra02]: 
“A Boolean formula f(x1, ..., xn) is a tautology if f(x1, ..., xn) = 1 for every x1, ..., xn. A 
Boolean formula f(x1, ..., xn) is unsatisfiable if f(x1, ..., xn) = 0 for every x1, ..., xn. 
Obviously, f is a tautology if and only if ~f is unsatisfiable. 
Given a formula f(x1, ..., xn), one can decide whether or not f is a tautology by 
checking all the possibilities for assignments to x1, ..., xn. However, the time needed 
for this procedure is exponential in the number of variables, and hence may be 
exponential in the length of the formula f. … 
P ≠ NP is the central open problem in complexity theory and one of the most 
important open problems in mathematics today. The problem has thousands of 
equivalent formulations. One of these formulations is the following: 
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Is there a polynomial time algorithm A that gets as input a Boolean formula f and 
outputs 1 if and only if f is a tautology? P ≠ NP states that there is no such 
algorithm.” 
2. Gödel’s proof and the PvNP problem 
We note, first, that, in his seminal paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions [Go31], 
Gödel has defined a formula, [R(x)]3, and shown that: 
(i) [R(x)] is constructible in a standard, first-order, Peano Arithmetic, PA; 
(ii) we can prove, meta-mathematically, that [R(x)] translates as an arithmetical 
tautology, R(x), under the standard interpretation (Appendix C), M, of the 
Arithmetic; 
(iii) [R(x)] is not provable in the Arithmetic. 
We consider, next: 
Definition 1: A total number-theoretical relation, R(x1, x2, ..., xn), when treated as a 
Boolean function, is Turing-decidable in M if, and only if, it is instantiationally 
equivalent to a number-theoretic relation, S(x1, x2, ..., xn), and there is a Turing-
machine T such that, for any given natural number sequence, (a1, a2, ..., an), T will 
compute S(a1, a2, ..., an) as either TRUE, or as FALSE. 
Definition 2: A total number-theoretical relation, R(x1, x2, ..., xn), when treated as a 
Boolean function, is Turing-computable in M if, and only if, there is a Turing-
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machine T such that, for any given natural number sequence, (a1, a2, ..., an), T will 
compute R(a1, a2, ..., an) as either TRUE, or as FALSE. 
Now, in [Go31], Gödel’s reasoning only shows that R(x) is Turing-decidable as always 
TRUE (when treated as a Boolean function). 
However, the question remains:  
Is R(x) also Turing-computable as always TRUE (when treated as a Boolean 
function)? 
The distinction4 assumes significance in the light of the PvNP problem [Cook]. 
For, if we assume, first, that every total arithmetical relation, which is Turing-computable 
as always TRUE, is the standard interpretation of a PA-provable formula, then R(x) is not 
Turing-computable as always TRUE, and, so, P ≠ NP. 
If we assume, however, that there is a total arithmetical relation that is Turing-
computable as always TRUE, but which is not the standard interpretation5 of a PA-
provable formula, then this implies that there is a non-standard model6 of PA. 
                                                 
4
 Note that, although decidability of a number-theoretic relation, which can be interpreted as a Turing-
algorithm in the classical sense (cf. [Me64], p229-237), necessarily implies Turing-computability, the 
converse need not hold. 
 
Thus, classically, such a number-theoretic relation, R(x), would be decidable as true if it is instantiationally 
equivalent, for any given natural number, to a number-theoretic relation, S(x), which can be interpreted as a 
Turing-algorithm in the classical sense, and which is Turing-computable as TRUE for all natural numbers. 
 
However, we cannot conclude from this, without proof, that R(x) must also be interpretable as a Turing-
algorithm in the classical sense, and be Turing-computable as TRUE for all natural numbers. 
 
In fact the PvsNP problem, as enunciated by Raz [Ra02], is equivalent to asking whether there are number-
theoretical relations that are Turing-decidable as always TRUE, but not Turing-computable as always 
TRUE. 
 
5
 The word “interpretation” may be used both in its familiar, linguistic, sense, and in a mathematically 
precise sense; the appropriate meaning is usually obvious from the context. 
 
 4 
We conclude that, if PA has no non-standard models, then, under the above expression 
[Ra02] of the PvNP problem, P ≠ NP.  
3. Standard, first-order, PA has no non-standard model 
We now give an elementary proof that, if PA is a standard, first-order, Peano Arithmetic - 
as defined in Appendix A and Appendix B - then PA has no non-standard model. 
 We denote by G(x) the PA-formula: 
 [x=0 v ~(∀y)~(x=y')]. 
This translates, under every interpretation of PA, as: 
Either x is 0, or x is a ‘successor’. 
Now, in every interpretation of PA, we have that: 
(a) G(0) is true; 
                                                 
Mathematically, following Tarski ([Me64], §2, p49): “An interpretation consists of a non-empty set D, 
called the domain of the interpretation, and an assignment to each predicate letter Aj
n
 of an n-place relation 
in D, to each function letter fjn of an n-place operation in D (i.e., a function from Dn into D), and to each 
individual constant ai of some fixed element of D. Given such an interpretation, variables are thought of as 
ranging over the set D, and ~, =>, and quantifiers are given their usual meaning. (Remember that an n-
place relation in D can be thought of as a subset of Dn, the set of all n-tuples of elements of D.)” 
 
We note that the interpreted relation R'(x) is obtained from the formula [R(x)] of a formal system P by 
replacing every primitive, undefined symbol of P in the formula [R(x)] by an interpreted mathematical 
symbol. So the P-formula [(∀x)R(x)] interprets as the sentence (∀x)R'(x), and the P-formula [~(∀x)R(x)] 
as the sentence ~(∀x)R'(x). 
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(b) If G(x) is true, then G(x') is true. 
It follows, from Gödel's completeness theorem7, that: 
(a) [G(0)] is provable in PA; 
(b) [G(x) => G(x')] is provable in PA. 
We also have, by Generalisation (Appendix A), that: 
(c) [(∀x)(G(x) => G(x'))] is provable in PA; 
From the Induction axiom S9 (Appendix B), we thus have that: 
(d) [(∀x)G(x)] is provable in PA. 
We conclude that, except 0, every element in the domain of any interpretation of PA is a 
‘successor’ of 0. 
5. Conclusions 
Since, by definition, the ‘successors’ of 0 are the natural numbers, it follows that: 
Theorem 1: There are no non-standard models of a standard, first-order, Peano 
Arithmetic. 
Corollary 1: P ≠ NP. 
Corollary 2: An arithmetical relation is Turing-computable as always TRUE if, and 
only if, it is the standard interpretation of a PA-provable formula. 
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Appendix A: Logical Symbols, Axioms, and Rules of Inference of PA 
The primitive logical symbols of PA are: 
   →             &         v         ~           ∀             x, y, ...           a, b, ... 
implies       and       or       not       for all       variables       constant terms 
If A, B, C are well-formed formulas of PA, then the logical axioms of PA are: 
(1) A → (B → A); 
(2) (A → (B → C)) → ((A → B) → (A → C)); 
(3) (~B → ~A) → ((~B → A) → B); 
(4) (∀x)A(x) → A(t), if A(x) is a well-formed formula of PA, and t is a term of PA 
free for x in A(x); 
(5) (∀x)(A → B) → (A → (∀x)B), if A is a well-formed formula of PA containing 
no free occurrences of x. 
The rules of inference of PA are: 
(i) Modus Ponens: B follows from A and A → B; 
(ii) Generalisation: (∀x)A follows from A. 
By Tarski's definitions of the satisfiability and truth of the formulas of PA under an 
interpretation, when the rules of inference are applied to true well-formed formulas of PA 
under a given interpretation, then the results of these applications are also true (i.e., every 
theorem of PA is true in any model of PA). (cf. [Me64], p57) 
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Appendix B: Primitive Symbols and Proper Axioms of PA  
 
In a standard, first order, Peano Arithmetic, ([Me64], p103): 
(a) PA has a single predicate letter, A21 (as usual, we write “ t = s ” for A21(t, s); 
(b) PA has one individual constant a1 (written, as usual, “ 0 “); 
(c) PA has three function letters f11, f21, f22. We shall write “ t' ” instead of f11(t); “ 
t+s ” instead of f21(t, s); and “ t*s ” instead of f22(t, s). 
The proper axioms of PA are: 
(S1) (x1 = x2) → ((x1 = x3) → (x2 = x3)); 
(S2) (x1 = x2) → (x1' = x2'); 
(S3) 0 ≠ (x1)'; 
(S4) ((x1)' = (x2)') → (x1 = x2); 
(S5) (x1 + 0) = x1; 
(S6) (x1 + x2') = (x1 + x2)'; 
(S7) (x1*0) = 0 
(S8) (x1*(x2')) = ((x1* x2) + x1); 
(S9) For any well-formed formula F(x) of PA: 
F(0) → ((∀x)(F(x) → F(x')) → (∀x)F(x)). 
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Appendix C: The standard interpretation, M, of PA ([Me64], p107) 
The standard interpretation, M, of PA, is taken to be the intuitive arithmetic of the natural 
numbers, as expressed by Dedekind's semi-axiomatic formulation of the Peano 
Postulates, where: 
(i) the integer 0 is the interpretation of the PA-symbol “ 0 ”; 
(ii) the successor operation (addition of 1) is the interpretation of the 
PA-symbol “ ' ”; 
(iii) ordinary addition and multiplication are the interpretations of the 
PA-symbols “ + ” and “ * ”; 
(iv) the interpretation of the PA-symbol “ = ” is the identity relation. 
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